Three-Judge Panel of the Upper Tribunal confirms the proper approach to psychological distress cases in the PIP Regulations

A three-judge panel of the Upper Tribunal (Heather Williams J, Upper Tribunal Judge Stout and Upper Tribunal Judge Butler) has handed down judgment in AH and AK v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2026] UKUT 50 (AAC), an important case clarifying the proper approach to the interpretation of the Personal Independence Payment Regulations (PIP Regulations).

The first appellant, AH, is a young woman with a complex mental health presentation. In her PIP application and in her evidence to the First-tier Tribunal, AH stated that she did not and could not leave her home without the support of another person. When she did leave the house, she would experience severe anxiety symptoms and required another person to support her to complete a journey safely.

The Secretary of State awarded AH 10 points under mobility descriptor 1(e), which applies where a claimant cannot undertake any journey due to overwhelming psychological distress. AH argued that descriptor 1(f) (12 points) should apply, which concerns inability to follow the route of a familiar journey without another person, assistance dog, or orientation aid.

The Upper Tribunal allowed the appeal. The appellant's case as to the proper approach to the construction of the PIP Regulations was accepted. In particular:

1. Mobility descriptors should be considered in the order 1(a) to 1(d), then 1(f), and finally 1(e), as descriptor 1(e) reflects the greatest functional limitation. The task of the decision-maker is to assess a claimant's functional capacity, and when considering what a claimant is able to do, "it is logical for the assessment to proceed stage-by-stage through the various descriptors for the particular activity in the sequence that reflects an increasing level of limitation" [70].
2. Regulation 4(2A), which requires activities being assessed to be performed safely, to an acceptable standard, repeatedly and within a reasonable time, must not be applied in an unduly narrow way when applied to mobility descriptors [80]. Descriptors 1(f) and 1(e) should not be "interpreted in such a way as to create a cohort of claimants who fall between descriptors 1.f and 1.e and so score points under neither descriptor" [87]. Such an approach would be at odds with the enabling purpose of the PIP Regulations and the legislative intention underpinning them.
3. In cases such as AH's, the decision-maker, and the FTT standing in its shoes, must consider whether the claimant can follow the route of a journey safely, to an acceptable standard, repeatedly and within a reasonable time period, unless they have the benefit of one of the forms of assistance referred to in those descriptors. If they cannot, the decision-maker will need to proceed to consider whether descriptor 1(e) applies [82].
4. When considering the application of regulation 7(2), which provides that a descriptor is satisfied if on a day in the required period it is likely that the claimant would have satisfied that descriptor, a purposive approach must be adopted. The UT clarified that "when applying mobility descriptor 1.f... the decision-maker must ask in relation to any given day in the required period, if they were assessed on this day, would the claimant be unable to follow the route of a familiar journey to a regulation 4(2A) standard if unaided and, if so, whether they would be able to do this to a regulation 4(2A) standard if they had the assistance contemplated by descriptor 1.f" [112].

Applying the proper approach to AH's case, the First-tier Tribunal conflated its consideration of descriptor 1(f) and 1(e), and adopted an unduly expansive approach to "overwhelming" in concluding that AH's "overwhelming psychological distress" was such that she could not undertake any journey to the regulation 4(2A) standard [123]. The appeal was allowed and remitted for rehearing.

Matthew Fraser and Claudia Hyde acted pro bono for AH, instructed by Kester Dean of Kester Disability Rights.