David Blundell KC and Harriet Wakeman successful…

On 18 December 2025, judgment was handed down by the Supreme Court in Secretary of State for the Home Department v Kolicaj [2025] UKSC 49. The Supreme Court unanimously allowed the Secretary of State’s appeal and dismissed Mr Kolicaj’s cross-appeal. David Blundell KC and Harriet Wakeman appeared before the Supreme Court on behalf of the successful Secretary of State for the Home Department. The judgment provides useful clarification on the application of the public law principle of the procedural fairness to deprivation of citizenship decisions.

The appeal concerned Mr Kolicaj, who had been convicted of money laundering offences, after participating in an organised crime group that removed nearly £8 million from the UK to Albania. The money was the proceeds of unspecified criminal activity. The Secretary of State decided to deprive Mr Kolicaj of his British citizenship, pursuant to s.40(2) of the British Nationality Act 1981 (“BNA 1981”) on the basis that his deprivation was conducive to the public good because of Mr Kolicaj’s involvement in serious organised crime.

The Court of Appeal had held that whilst it was legitimate for the Secretary of State to operate a system whereby she did not offer the opportunity for representations to be made before a deprivation of citizenship decision is made (because of the risk that the subject will renounce any other citizenship they possess thereby rendering themselves stateless), procedural fairness required the Secretary of State to offer an opportunity to make representations after the decision has been taken, and to conduct a merits-based evaluation in light of any representations made.

The appeal was heard on 4 November 2025 by Lord Reed, Lord Lloyd-Jones, Lord Briggs, Lord Sales and Lord Stephens.

The key issues for the Supreme Court to determine, in addition to three Respondent’s Notice points, were:

Was it procedurally unfair for the Secretary of State for the Home Department to deprive Mr Kolicaj of his British citizenship without affording him an opportunity to make representations following the Secretary of State’s deprivation decision? (Ground 1)
Did the Court of Appeal err in law by quashing the deprivation order made against Mr Kolicaj? (Ground 2)

In his judgment, Lord Sales (with whom Lord Reed, Lord Lloyd-Jones, Lord Briggs and Lord Stephens agreed) reviewed a number of recent key authorities and confirmed that there was no basis for distinguishing R (Begum) v Special Immigration Appeals Commission [2021] UKSC 7, [2021] AC 765; U3 v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] UKSC 19, [2025] 2 WLR 1041; and N3 v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] UKSC 6, [2025] AC 1510 on the grounds that they concerned appeals to SIAC under s.2B of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997 rather than appeals to the FTT under s.40A of the BNA 1981: [46]-[60].

The Supreme Court clarified that an appellate court’s jurisdiction under both s.40A and s.2B is appellate rather than supervisory, and that the legal principles which the appellate court is to apply are determined not by the characterisation of being an appeal ‘on the merits’ but by the nature of the decision under appeal and the relevant statutory provisions. The Court reiterated that this can result in different principles being applied to different aspects of the same appeal.

The Supreme Court also confirmed that new evidence can be adduced in an appeal under both s.40A of the BNA 1981 and s.2B of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997, and that the subject matter of any such appeal is the decision as maintained at the time of the appeal, in light of any new evidence and new submissions which come to light in the course of the appeal process.

As to Ground 1, the Supreme Court therefore concluded that procedural fairness did not require the Secretary of State to offer to review her decision on the merits following representations because the deprivation decision could be challenged by way of an appeal on the merits, where evidence can be adduced, and representations can be made. Accordingly, there was no fairness gap of the kind contemplated by the Court of Appeal: [62]-[63].

Although it was not strictly necessary to do so, the Supreme Court also went on to consider Ground 2 to provide clarification for future appeals: [69]. As to Ground 2, the Supreme Court concluded that the Court of Appeal did have the power to set aside the deprivation notice and order, because the First-tier Tribunal and SIAC are clothed with all powers reasonably incidental to the exercise of that jurisdiction, which includes the power to set-aside the Secretary of State’s decision, and to set-aside the notice and order which flow from any such decision: [70]-[71]. By extension, the Court of Appeal had jurisdiction on an appeal to exercise all the powers which the inferior court or tribunal has, in accordance with s.15(3) of the Senior Courts Act 1981, and so it too could set aside the notice and order: [72].

The Supreme Court also went on to dismiss the three Respondent’s Notice points advanced on behalf of Mr Kolicaj: [76]-[80]; [81]-[82] and [87]-[88].

David Blundell KC and Harriet Wakeman were instructed for the Secretary of State for the Home Department.

A recording of the hearing is available here.